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Abstract. In this paper we argue that the evolution of protocols is one
of the most important yet least understood aspects of the governance
of information systems. At the deepest level, security protocols deter-
mine the power structure of a system: who can do what with whom. The
development, adoption, spread and evolution of protocols, and competi-
tion between them, are both political and economic activities. They may
reconcile multiple objectives or be the battlefield in which one interest
defeats another. They occur at all levels in the online ecosystem, from
individual and small-firm action, up through organisations and networks
to whole ecosystems – and may eventually play a role in shaping culture,
values and norms. They play a key role in innovation: early movers may
use protocols to establish a strategic advantage and lock competitors out.
How can we understand such complex behaviour? In this paper we sketch
a possible framework inspired by research in institutional economics.
1 Introduction
Security protocols often support not just a community of users but a business
community, and evolve with it. It should be obvious that if a protocol is designed
by Alice, we might expect it to suit her strategic purposes. But this can make
Bob unhappy, and the protocol eventually needs to be redesigned. A mature
discussion of security needs to take account of how protocols evolve. However,
we rapidly get out of the space of two-player games.
Previous workshops on security protocols have discussed several examples
of protocols acquiring new features until eventually they broke, as a result of
feature interaction or implementation complexity. The system designed by IBM
and others to encrypt PINs in a bank’s ATMs was extended by Visa and others
to support worldwide networks of banks, ATMs and point-of-sale devices. That
led to API attacks which arose from unanticipated feature interactions [9]. It was
extended further to deal with EMV smartcards, leading to further vulnerabilities
and attacks [14]. The same holds for SSL/TLS protocol suite, which is now more
than 20 years old; it has accumulated options (such as export ciphersuites) and
features (such as heartbeat) which have led to significant vulnerabilities. Because
of the enormous number and diversity of users, fixes usually have to be applied
at one end only; simultaneous upgrades to both clients and servers are hard [22].
This much is reasonably well known. At previous protocols workshops we
have touched on economic models of protocols [5], asked whether in a democratic
system there should be a ‘loyal attacker’, inspired by the ‘loyal opposition’ in
parliament [7] and discussed crowdsourcing social trust [11]. In this paper we ap-
ply concepts from institutional economics to provide a framework for discussing
the ways in which protocols evolve at different scales of organisation and time,
and the effects on innovation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes John Groe-
newegen’s model of innovation in the electricity industry, and our proposed sim-
plification of it for protocol analysis. Section 3 looks at protocol creep, bugfixes
and tussles. Section 4 considers protocol complements and the scaling of innova-
tion. Section 5 attempts to draw some conclusions – for the ‘Internet of Things’,
for dispute resolution, and for the kinds of online conflict we have seen around
recent elections on social media. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 6.
2 The Groenewegen model of innovation
The institutional economist John Groenewegen proposed a model of innovation
in the electric power industry [16], which we copy in Figure 1.
The point of such models is that technology evolves in ways that depend
on scale, on networks, and on history. Once you’ve invented the battery, you
can perhaps electroplate spoons with silver. In theory you could make and sell
torches, but in practice the electric lamp was not invented until the dynamo came
along, and electricity got much cheaper. Given these technologies, any town that
already has gas lighting should replace it with electric lighting, which is cheaper.
Once several towns have electric power companies, it’s worthwhile for them to
build a grid and perhaps even merge to get economies of scale. The utilities then
become natural monopolies, which brings in regulation.
At a workshop at Schloss Dagstuhl in November 2016 we discussed this with
Johannes Bauer, Thomas Maillart, Barbara Kordy, Gabriele Lenzini and Sebas-
tian Pape and simplified it to four levels. For present purposes, we simplify it
still further as in Figure 2.
At the bottom, at level 4, are the actions of individuals or small firms; the
person who invents a device, or writes a piece of software for their own use, and
perhaps makes a few copies for friends. The time taken to do this can be very
short, perhaps a matter of days to weeks.
At the next level up we start to industrialise, with the emergence of a sub-
stantial firm or network. This might be a physical network, such as the electric
wiring installed to convert a town’s gas light to electricity, or a virtual network,
as where software runs on a particular type of machine. Both can support inno-
vation. A power company that recovers its startup costs from a street lighting
contract can then start selling electricity to homes, and once that’s available it
starts to make sense for people to invent appliances. An example of a virtual
network is where firms started selling home computers in the 1980s, which led
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Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
Layer 4
Layer 5
Informal institutions:
- Culture
- Values
- Norms
Technology:
- Trajectories
- Artefacts
- Operationalisation
Formal institutions:
- Political system
- Role of state
- Relationships between bureaucracy, politics and business
Formal institutions:
- Laws (property rights) and regulations (price regulation)
- Policies (competition, technology, economic, financial)
Institutional arrangements:
- Contracts
- Organisations (vertical integration)
- Hybrids like network
Individual actors:
- Mental maps
- Habits, routines
- Human creativity and learning
- Powerbase for opportunism (encapsulation)
Fig. 1. Groenewegen’s model of innovation, recreated from [16]
Layer 1
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Layer 3
Layer 4
Top layer:
- Culture
- Values
- Norms
Ecosystem:
- Bureaucracy
- Politics
- Business
Rules:
- Contracts
- Organisations
- Networks
Individual actors:
- Habits
- routines
Fig. 2. Our innovation stack model
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rapidly to the emergence of games companies that wrote software for them. The
time constant for the emergence of a firm or network is typically 1–10 years.
The level above that is an environment or ecosystem, of which our starting
example is a power grid plus its associated regulation, standards and markets.
A grid may cover a section of a large country (as in the USA) or several smaller
countries or regions (as in the EU, or the grid covering Ireland and Northern
Ireland). Similarly, the Internet can be seen as an environment, while large ser-
vice firms like Microsoft, Google and Facebook try hard to maintain their own
ecosystems: their products work better together than with their competitors’ of-
ferings. The time constant to build an ecosystem is measured in decades rather
than years.
Finally, the top level is one of culture, norms, religions, or (as Groenewegen
puts it) social embeddedness. Culture is slow to change, but it does indeed change
in response to changes in a civilisation’s underlying technology package. Putnam
documented, for example, how the arrival of television noticeably cut participa-
tion in club membership and group social activities, and no doubt the spread
of smartphones [21], while Pinker ascribes the Enlightenment to the spread of
the novel [20]. The rapid adoption of smartphones, messaging and social media
over the past decade will no doubt have an impact too. In general, the time con-
stant of cultural change is measured in centuries; however it does occasionally
happen that a noticeable change occurs in the course of a human lifetime. One
might argue that the Enlightenment and the late 20th century rights revolution
were such, and were at least in part facilitated by technological changes (print-
ing and television respectively). Social conservatives may deplore one or even
both of these developments; that such resistance can last for centuries merely
underscores the slow pace of cultural change.
This ‘innovation stack’ seems an attractive way to describe and analyse in-
novation in fields other than electric power, as it reflects how technology en-
trepreneurs actually think. In the 1970s and 1980s, a small software company
that had written a system to automate a sawmill (say) would then try to
parametrise it and sell it to all sawmills; having done a project, you work to
build it into a firm. From there, the next aspiration is to become a platform.
The success of IBM, DEC and later Microsoft emphasised the value of being
an ecosystem used by many industries rather than just one; during the dotcom
boom, one startup after another would tell its investors it was going to be the
Microsoft in some industry sector or another. Those who succeeded, such as
Amazon, became household names, and this approach to business is discussed
in detail by Shapiro and Varian’s book “Information Rules” [23], which became
the top business book in 1998. Now the largest firms such as Amazon, Ap-
ple, Google and Facebook attempt to embed themselves in culture, by not just
building ecosystems around their core products but by shaping human behaviour
around them and channeling it through them. At each step, ambitious firms try
to move up to the next level in the stack; few succeed; but those who do reap
tremendous rewards.
Can this framework give useful perspectives on how protocols evolve?
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3 Protocol evolution
We first consider three forms of protocol evolution: growth, bugfixes and tussles.
3.1 What successful evolution looks like
Our first example is the world card payment network, which can be seen as
emerging from the local innovation of Diners’ Club in New York in 1950; both
credit and debit cards were first offered by single banks to local customers,
then networked together first nationally and then internationally. The protocol
history really starts with the first cash machines fielded by Barclays in 1967.
Early ATMs used ad-hoc mechanisms for PIN security but rapidly converged
on a methodology pioneered by IBM. A single bank could give each customer a
PIN generated by encrypting their account number with a secret PIN Derivation
Key, available in all the bank’s ATMs and also to its central mainframe.
This was then adapted to provide dual control, so that no member of bank
staff would ever see any PIN other than their own, with a view to both minimis-
ing insider fraud and defending the bank against claims from customers who had
been defrauded (or pretended to be). The mechanism was to embed the crypto-
graphic keys in tamper-resistant hardware, both in the ATM and in a Hardware
Security Module (HSM) at the bank. The cards and PINs sent to customers
could be sent from different data centres, or from the same centre on different
days; and likewise the pairs of keys used to initialise ATMs [6].
The natural next step was to extend the communications to support inter-
bank networking, a project driven by Visa and other card brands in the early
1980s. Further features were added, such as allowing customers to choose their
own PINs. This allowed convenient worldwide ATM networking, and in due
course a serpent appeared in the garden: things had become so complex that at-
tacks started to emerge based on careless design [4] and feature interaction [14].
No sooner had the worst of these attacks been mitigated but the banks rolled
out EMV, adding a further layer of complexity; and the inevitable attacks were
found in due course [24].
The card payment system evolved from being a single-bank system (level 3)
to being an ecosystem (level 2), and assurance failed because of a combination
of bloat, feature interaction and institutional economics. As noted in [18], the
implementation of EMV in Britain involves thousands of pages of specifications,
as the cost of building the ecosystem was accepting backwards compatibility
with a lot of legacy systems. The combination of features that led, for example,
to the No-PIN attack is scattered around this huge corpus. The bank brands
building the ecosystem had insufficient incentive to insist on formal verification
or even adversarial review. The member banks also have conflicts of interest in-
ternally [17]: an acquiring bank that uses a less secure PIN entry device increases
the risk of fraud across all local card issuers, yet it’s unlikely to face more than a
few percent or so of this fraud itself. Ultimately, the limits to security are about
governance.
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3.2 Dealing with protocol failure
At Indocrypt 2011, Rescorla asked why the Internet runs on pre-historic cryp-
tography [22]. His point was that while the basic TLS protocol may be secure
in theory (it was verified by Paulson in the 1990s [19]), it has been broken
repeatedly in practice because of features that were not verified (such as er-
ror handling), emergent properties of implementations (such as timing), forced
parameter choices (such as export ciphersuites) and add-ons (such as session
resumption – to which we would nowadays add heartbeats). Yet it has proved
almost impossible in practice to fix these flaws properly. A robust solution would
in most cases involve changes at both ends at once, which is impractical. So long
as a few percent of online shoppers still use IE version 6, almost no merchant
will be prepared to move entirely to modern ciphersuites that would abandon
these customers and their business.
The combination of scale and network effects means that it is cheap to tweak
the code, but extremely expensive to change the architecture. TLS 1.0 dates to
the 1990s; versions 1.1 and 1.2 were minor tweaks; the more significant upgrade
to 1.3 is still a work in progress. Similarly, the move from magnetic-strip-based
ATMs and POS transactions to the smart-based EMV involved pilots in the
early 1990s, standardisation work in the late 1990s and finally a roll-out in
2002 – which is still not complete. This roll-out has involved substantial local
customisation, and incremental changes are still being made to support new
services and patch up vulnerabilities that get exploited. Even there, it can be
slow; it took UK banks over 5 years to block the No-PIN attack [18]. In biological
terms, we can see protocols as a case of punctuated equilibrium rather than
gradualism. Cladogenesis – the creation of new species – is not however down to
a near-extinction natural event, but to richer forms of competition and conflict.
3.3 Dealing with conflict
Many of the interesting cases arise when an incumbent protocol is challenged. In
2012 we wrote of how the overlay payment service Sofortu¨berweisung (Sofort)
challenged the incumbent giro payment system operated by banks in Germany
and Austria [7]. Germany in particular has many small banks who did not oper-
ate very competitive payment service; Sofort built a system that would enable
account holders to log into their bank accounts via its systems and make easy,
rapid payments for online purchases. In effect, it was performing a Man-in-The-
Middle (MiTM) attack on the German banking system, and providing a better,
cheaper payment service that pleased both customers and merchants. The banks
sued, accusing Sofort of inducing their customers to break the terms and con-
ditions under which their accounts were operated. The competition authorities
intervened, advising the court that the competition brought by Sofort was so-
cially beneficial. The case was stayed and Sofort duly acquired a banking license.
In that case, the effect of a challenge to an established ecosystem was that
the challenger established itself as a player and slightly improved or extended
the ecosystem’s services. The same pattern can be found in a number of other
cases:
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– During the dotcom boom, a number of new payment service firms sprung
up to challenge the credit card industry, which is dominated by the Visa-
Mastercard duopoly and thus somewhat slow-moving; the winner, PayPal,
has in effect become a leading credit card acquirer, although it also has its
own payment mechanism for personal account holders to use.
– The establishment by Android and Apple of phone payment mechanisms
from 2011 was also intended as a challenge to the credit card duopoly1 but
did not really take off until after contactless credit cards became mainstream,
leading retailers to upgrade their terminal fleets; it is now, like PayPal, a
minor add-on to the credit card ecosystem.
There have also been cases where the absence of a viable incumbent enabled
a protocol to establish a new ecosystem rather than just slightly extending an
existing one:
– About 200 mobile-phone payment systems have been set up in various less
developed countries, and about 20 of them have become mainstream2. In
such protocols, the payer sends an encrypted SMS message or USSD com-
mand to a payment server ordering it pay a certain sum to a given phone
number; the payee gets a message certifying receipt. The killer app was
migrant remittances in an environment where most people had no access
to conventional banking services but where mobile phones were spreading
rapidly. The best-known is Kenya’s M-Pesa whose operator Safaricom pro-
cesses payments amounting to a substantial proportion of Kenya’s GDP3,
becoming a larger payment service provider than any local bank, and has
also become the monopoly Mobile Network Operator. In this case, regulation
can be used after a monopoly establishes its presence to thwart attempts by
newcomers to disturb the innovation stack and undermine the monopolist’s
control: the monopoly (Safaricom) uses regulation to accuse innovators of un-
dermining its service, and thereby stalling the innovators’ efforts in lengthy
legal battles4. Moreover, attempts over the past ten years to set up similar
phone payment systems in developed countries (such as Pingit and PayM in
Britain) have generated little traction, as people in such countries already
have plenty ways of paying both online and offline.
– The SSL/TLS protocol was different. It was the outcome of a challenge by
Netscape in 1995 to a protocol suite, SET, that was getting too complex
1 Full disclosure: the first author assisted with the design of Android Pay while a
scientific visitor at Google.
2 See GSMA’s ‘Mobile for Development’ website (using the Mobile Money filter): http:
//www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/tracker
3 See mobile payment statistics at the Central Bank of Kenya: https://www.
centralbank.go.ke
4 For example, see Safaricom’s battle with Equity bank over the bank’s
use of overlay SIMs to circumvent the restrictions on phones (https:
//www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000135850/safaricom-loses-
battle-to-block-equity-bank-s-thin-sim-card), and Safaricom’s battle with
BitPesa (https://www.bitpesa.co/blog/bitpesa-v-safaricom/)
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and difficult to implement. SET was a large collaboration between industry
players (including Netscape and Microsoft) and the banking industry (Visa
and Mastercard) to design a standard online credit card payment system.
However, there were too many players, the specification got too complex, and
implementing it would have required every bank to certify the public keys
not just of its merchants but all its cardholders. It became clear that many
banks would take years to even get online; large-scale certificate issuance was
going to leave many potential customers stranded. SSL gave a quick and dirty
way to get card transactions online, with only the merchants having to buy
certificates – which they could do from third-party CAs.
In the case of SSL/TLS, the cost of not authenticating both ends of the trans-
action was phishing; but that only got going until 2005, ten years after SSL was
first launched. SSL/TLS does however requires certification of the public keys
of servers at least. This brings us to the topic of how the evolution of a protocol
can be affected by externalities, such as required complementary services.
4 Protocol complements and scaling
Public-key cryptography started off as a monopoly protected by the Diffie-
Hellman and RSA patents; the operating company, RSA Data Security, issued
certificates as a service to customers. This was spun off in 1995 as Verisign,
and as the patents reached their end of life, this company became the next big
money-spinner [3]. During the dotcom boom, it established a dominant position
by purchasing rivals such as Thawte. However various nation states and others
pressured Microsoft to put their root keys into the browser, so as to facilitate
interception, leading to several hundred organisations becoming ‘trusted’.
Iran was excluded, and hacked DigiNotar so as to be able to run MiTM at-
tacks on dissidents. This led to the industry, led by Google, excluding Diginotar
and thus terminating its business. The resulting disruption, which included mul-
tiple Dutch government departments not being able to offer their usual online
services until they had acquired new certificates from elsewhere, was a shock to
the industry. The result was a ‘flight to quality’ with most extended-validation
certificates now issued by Verisign (now owned by Symantec), with Comodo the
next largest. These CAs are considered “too big to fail” despite the fact that
Verisign also suffered a data breach in 2010 and the Iranians also got Comodo
certificates at one point [10].
This is not the first time the fight has been over complements to an ecosys-
tem; IBM used its patents on punched cards as a key tool in its fight against
Remington Rand and others for dominance of the tabulating machine market in
the 1930s [2]. Shapiro and Varian discuss other cases of complements being used
for leverage in battles to dominate markets with network externalities [23].
A key question however is scope. For example, the ‘Internet of Things’ is
shaping up to be not one ecosystem but many, in each of which the objects sold
by a vendor communicate with its cloud services and through them to a user’s
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phone. There is no real reason for the security protocols to be standard TLS,
except perhaps in that the phone app may embed a lot of ad networks that need
to rely on standards [8].
The lack of standards can cause real problems, such as in the failure to provide
for the home area network (HAN) in the smart meter ecosystem promoted in the
EU [1]. Different Member States adopted different standards for communication
with appliances in the home, with none of them gaining enough traction to
appeal to appliance vendors. As a result, it looks like the Google Nest standards
may prevail. The EU regulators should have standardised local interconnectivity
first if they wanted meters and appliances to communicate directly rather than
via third-party service firms. In this case too, the scope of complements had a
critical effect on scaling.
A further computer-science approach is to think in terms of centralisation
versus distribution. In practical terms, the world of IT has spent 50 years cen-
tralising things and putting them online. But it does have limits, and these are
often as much political as technical; data localisation laws, local telecoms reg-
ulation and bank supervision are three salient examples. Last year we talked
about DigiTally5, where an overlay network can be used to do an end-run round
an incumbent payment system that’s entrenched thanks to a mobile network
monopoly; there too, however, there is a centralised issuer. In this particular
case the multiple protocols (GSM for basic communications and then SMS or
overlay for two competing or complementary payment systems) can compete in
the normal commercial and political arenas. There we learned that one should
always ask: where is the choke point? The incumbent’s control of the agent net-
work is one of the foundations of its monopoly, along with its control of the
API and the dominant telco (that the government is a shareholder also doesn’t
harm them in this context). However, this is not always purely technological.
For mobile payments in Kenya it is the 40,000 agents who turn banknotes into
bits. The DigiTally case study reminds us that this is likely to come down to
the sort of economics that competition policy people worry about, namely how
institutions work in the real world, and the tussles between them.
5 New directions
The established literature on information economics already notes the impor-
tance of innovation in the success of a platform [23]. Windows (and before it
Unix and the IBM ecosystem) succeeded by providing a platform on which mil-
lions of programmers could innovate. When people bought the platform, they
gained access to the products of other innovators in the same ecosystem. The
positive feedback thus created led to platform success. The smart meter HAN
failed because people could not innovate; the default for an appliance maker is
5 See our previous SPW paper [12], CCS 2016 keynote (https://www.cl.cam.ac.
uk/~kabhb2/DigiTally/docs/ccs-vienna-2016.pdf), and the DigiTally project:
(https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~kabhb2/DigiTally/)
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to enable their equipment to be controlled remotely by the customer’s phone via
their own server.
Innovation is not just a matter of software; people also innovate by setting
up websites to support their hobbies and interests, or their social life. The effect
of scale here is less studied. However, we might estimate that while millions of
programmers benefited from the Windows platform as a space in which they
could innovate, the world-wide web increased this by an order of magnitude. It
enabled tens of millions of people to create websites by the mid-2000s; writing
HTML is easier than writing programs.
Since then, social media has increased the scale by two further orders of
magnitude. Facebook currently claims 1.9 billion active users, while networks in
China and Russia have hundreds of millions more. All you need to do is upload
a picture, click on a few friends and you’re away. Part of Facebook’s secret sauce
was minimising the amount of expertise and effort required to join.
Once just about everyone’s online, almost everything bubbles up, from cat
pictures to hate speech. In fact, Grossman notes that much of the unpleas-
antness online is just a democratisation of the unpleasantness previously seen
from tabloid newspapers and even state propaganda organisations: xenophobia,
smears, doxxing and other personal attacks [15].
At this point, the protocol researcher might ask, ‘What’s missing?’
Our ‘starter for ten’ is recourse. Pinker describes how human conflict has
dropped in stages from a high level in pre-state societies to the low levels found
today in most societies, and that the largest single fall was associated with the
emergence of the state.
The king provided justice, both as redress post facto, and as laws governing
such matters as land and marriage to minimise the number of disputes arising
in the first place. Gambetta’s studies of organised crime show that where justice
is not provided effectively by the state, there will be a temptation for private
actors to do it – and we do indeed find various kinds of Mafia online, such as
Dread Pirate Roberts and his Silk Road. Other options include industries able
to provide recourse as a service, such as the credit card system.
But a purely technical solution cannot be enough. If the purpose of the state is
to resolve disputes, it’s not enough to have an army to monopolise military force
in the jurisdiction and a college of judges to rule on individual cases. A state
is more than that. States historically were tied up with culture and religion;
they were as socially embedded as could be. From the elaborate negotiations
used by pre-state tribes to end feuds through the gruesome public executions of
early kings, justice evolved in society with splendid ritual: the English travelling
judge in his wig and robes was the emissary of the King’s Peace, and the jury
men he swore to try cases embedded the verdicts in the local community (or at
least in its elite). Law became democratic as society did; Blackstone describes
its evolution as a ‘long march from status to contract’ [13]. This works at many
levels; at the top level, of course, we elect our legislators, whose job it is to deal
with gaps that emerge between laws and social norms. As a result, most of the
people internalise the important rules most of the time.
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The dispute resolution system must be one that people actually believe in.
This belief ultimately has its roots in lived experience. The classic security engi-
neering view that ‘a trusted system is one that can break my security policy’ [6]
may be a good heuristic for reasoning about mechanism, but it is not enough
to reason about how systems are embedded in society, especially when people
feel anxious about globalisation, frustrated by call centres and infuriated when
‘computer says no’. Perhaps it’s not enough to assume we have an impartial
“judge”, who combines competence at cryptologic mathematics with effective
competence in the real world. Perhaps we have to start asking “To whom am
I really proving this?” Perhaps we have to start thinking about crowdsourced
mediation or arbitration: in short, about juries.
6 Conclusions
Shapiro and Varian’s classic “Information Rules” [23] is almost twenty years
old but still has much to say about how security protocols succeed or fail. We
have discussed a number of examples familiar to the protocols community, no-
tably payment protocols and SSL/TLS. There are interesting issues around peer
competition, and hacking everything from insulin pumps to tractors.
What we’ve tried to do here is organise the accumulated experience from 25
years of protocol workshops in an institutional economics framework.
Lessons learned include that if you want something to succeed you’d better
think hard about how it will be open to innovation by others. Alternatively, as
we’ve seen in mobile payment systems used in less developed countries, regula-
tion can be used after a monopoly establishes its presence to thwart attempts
by newcomers to disturb the innovation stack and undermine the monopolist’s
control.
Who are the innovators – programmers, micro-entrepreneurs from bloggers to
small firms, or everybody? Who will resolve disputes, and how? The framework
we’ve proposed suggests that it’s not enough to have a resolution mechanism that
can be verified using a logic of belief. It must be a mechanism in which people
actually believe. This is a topic that protocol researchers have barely touched;
the closest attempts so far may be on human auditability of digital elections.
Yet even those require people to trust mathematicians and other experts. The
events of 2016 suggest that expert opinion is not always enough. If protocols
are the tools of power in a digital age, how can they win genuine acceptance?
The crowdsourced reputation systems operated by firms such as Tripadvisor and
eBay may indicate a possible direction of travel. If people feel they don’t have
a voice any more, to the point that using customer feedback properly can give
a travel agency or auction house a real advantage, then in what circumstances
might it be possible to extend this to dispute resolution?
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